

First Draft of SWOC: Introductory Section

3 February 1970

The Strategic Warning Problem (China)

Introduction

1. This Report attempts to examine US intelligence capabilities to provide strategic early warning of Chinese Communist attack, over the next decade, against the USA; and, secondarily, against (a) US bases and forces in or near, and/or the territory of, the states of South, Southeast, and East Asia, and (b) the USSR.

2. This Report is limited to the subject of strategic warning, which the most recent National Intelligence Estimate on the subject defines as that warning which intelligence might provide prior to an actual attack. It is not concerned with tactical warning, which the Estimate defines as that which might be obtained by such means as indicating that an attack had been initiated. Thus the definition of strategic warning in this Report is essentially one of timing, not magnitude of attack.

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3. Accordingly, the Report will include (under para 1-a, above) strategic warning of possible Chinese limited military attacks in Asia, such as occurred in the cases of the Indian border and of the Chinese Nationalist-held offshore islands. The Report will not, however, include treatment of various types of Chinese Communist subversive activities in Southeast Asia or elsewhere.

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Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP73B00148A000200030047-7

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Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP73B00148A000200030047-7